Category: Ontology

  • Magic and Experiment

    Me: Trace the use or the word "experiment" in the ways that it was used before The Age of Reason.

    Deepseek: The word experiment has a rich history that evolved significantly before the Age of Reason (roughly the 17th–18th centuries). Its usage in earlier periods reflected broader and sometimes different meanings than its modern scientific connotation. Here’s a brief tracing of its use:

    1. Medieval Latin & Early Scholasticism (Pre-12th Century)

    • The term originates from the Latin experimentum, derived from experiri ("to try, test, or experience").

    • In medieval Latin, experimentum referred broadly to experience, trial, or test—not necessarily in a controlled scientific sense. It could mean:

    • Practical knowledge gained through repeated action (e.g., medical remedies, alchemical procedures).

    • Observations of natural phenomena (e.g., Roger Bacon’s use in the 13th century to describe empirical investigations).

    2. Middle English (14th–16th Century)

    • By the late Middle Ages, experiment entered English with similar broad meanings:

    • Medical & Alchemical Contexts: Often associated with secret knowledge or recipes (e.g., "experiments" in herbology or magic).

    • General Testing: Any kind of trial or proof (e.g., Geoffrey Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales references "experiment" in the sense of testing something).

    • Example: The Oxford English Dictionary cites a 14th-century text: "By experience and experiment, the truth is known."

    3. Renaissance (16th–Early 17th Century)

    • The term began to take on a more systematic meaning but still overlapped with experience and demonstration:

    • Natural Magic & Occult Philosophy: Figures like Giambattista della Porta (Magia Naturalis, 1558) used "experiment" to describe wondrous demonstrations (e.g., optical illusions, magnetism).

    • Early Empiricism: Francis Bacon (1561–1626) helped redefine experiment as a methodical investigation of nature, though his usage still retained older connotations of "trial" (e.g., Novum Organum, 1620).

    Key Shifts Before the Age of Reason:

    • From Passive to Active: Earlier usage often implied observing or recording (e.g., "an experiment of nature"), whereas later usage emphasized active intervention (e.g., controlled tests).

    • From Mystical to Methodical: In medieval/early Renaissance contexts, "experiments" could include alchemy or folk remedies; by the 17th century, the term became tied to reproducibility and hypothesis-testing.

    • Overlap with "Experience": Before the 1600s, the two words were sometimes interchangeable (e.g., Montaigne’s essays blend expérience and expérimentation).

    Contrast with the Age of Reason:

    • By the late 17th century (e.g., Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton), experiment became firmly associated with the scientific method—systematic, repeatable, and theory-driven. The older, broader meanings faded as empiricism dominated.

    Would you like examples from specific historical texts?

    Me: I am particularly interested in the way that Roger Bacon would have understood the word.

    Deepseek: Roger Bacon (c. 1219–1292), the medieval philosopher and Franciscan friar, used the term experimentum (Latin for "experiment") in a way that blended empirical observation, practical testing, and even theological or mystical knowledge. His understanding was deeply rooted in the scholastic tradition but also pushed beyond it, making him a unique figure in the history of science.

    How Roger Bacon Understood Experimentum

    1. Empirical Knowledge Gained Through Testing
    • Bacon distinguished between two types of knowledge:

    • Argumentum (knowledge from reasoning or authority).

    • Experimentum (knowledge gained through direct experience or testing).

    • He argued that experimentum was superior to mere logical deduction because it verified truths through sensory confirmation.

    • Example: In Opus Majus (1267), he writes that only through experimentum can we confirm whether a theory (like optics or medicine) holds true in practice.

    1. Active Intervention in Nature (Not Just Observation)
    • Unlike Aristotle, who emphasized passive observation, Bacon believed in manipulating nature to uncover its secrets.

    • Example: He described experiments with lenses, gunpowder, and even flying machines—though some were speculative.

    1. A Blend of Science, Magic, and Divine Wisdom
    • Bacon’s experimentum sometimes included alchemy, astrology, and natural magic—practices that blurred the line between science and occult knowledge.

    • He believed some truths (e.g., the properties of plants, celestial influences) could only be unlocked through experimentum guided by divine illumination.

    • Example: In De Secretis Operibus Artis et Naturae, he discusses "marvelous works" (e.g., mechanical wonders) achievable through experimental knowledge.

    1. A Method for Correcting Errors in Tradition
    • Bacon criticized scholars who relied solely on ancient texts (e.g., Aristotle, Avicenna) without testing claims.

    • Example: He questioned medical theories by testing remedies, noting that experimentum could disprove false doctrines.

    Key Difference from Modern "Experiment"

    • Not Fully Systematic: Bacon’s experimentum lacked the strict controls of later (Baconian or Newtonian) science.

    • Theological Framework: He believed ultimate truths came from God, and experimentum was a way to uncover divine laws.

    • Included Esoteric Knowledge: Some "experiments" involved cryptic symbols, alchemical processes, or divinely inspired insights.

    Conclusion

    For Bacon, experimentum was both a practical method and a philosophical principle—a way to move beyond book-learning and engage directly with nature, even if that engagement included mystical elements. His usage was a crucial step toward modern experimental science but remained embedded in medieval thought.

    Would you like specific quotes from his works illustrating this?

  • Mythical summarising  

    Me: Summarise Ernst Cassirers work "The Form of the Concept in Mythical Thinking"

    Deepseek: Ernst Cassirer's essay "The Form of the Concept in Mythical Thinking" (originally in Mythical Thought, Vol. 2 of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms) explores how conceptualization operates in myth, contrasting it with scientific and logical thought. Key points include:

    1. Myth as a Symbolic Form – Myth is not primitive or irrational but a distinct mode of structuring experience through symbolic representation.

    2. Concepts in Myth vs. Science – Unlike abstract, universal concepts in science, mythical concepts are concrete, tied to sensory and emotional experience. Myth groups phenomena by perceived affinities rather than logical categories (e.g., associating lightning with anger).

    3. Law of Participation (Lévy-Bruhl) – Myth operates via "participation," where entities merge identities (e.g., a tribe and its totem). Boundaries between objects are fluid, governed by symbolic, not empirical, relations.

    4. Unity of Life – Myth perceives a pervasive life-force connecting all things, leading to anthropomorphic and animistic explanations.

    5. Function Over Abstraction – Mythical concepts serve practical and ritual purposes rather than theoretical understanding. They are embedded in actions (e.g., magic rituals) rather than detached reflection.

    6. Transition to Theoretical Thought – Cassirer traces how mythical thinking evolves into religious, artistic, and eventually scientific thought, with each stage refining symbolic abstraction.

    Conclusion:

    Cassirer argues that mythical thinking is not inferior but a foundational layer of human cognition, emphasizing its role in shaping cultural meaning. It reveals how humans construct reality through symbolic systems before developing logical-scientific frameworks.

    Would you like a deeper analysis of any section?

  • Benjamins axions

    Me: In the first paragraph of Walter Benjamins “The Task of the Translator” he writes “In the appreciation of a work of art or an art form, consideration of the receiver never proves fruitful” and also “No poem is intended for the reader, no picture for the beholder, no symphony for the audience.”

    These statements are presented as axiomatic for the thesis he then expounds on in the text and he does not attempt to justify this position.

    However, it seems to me from the cultural perspective I have here and now that these statements would benefit from a justification. My assumption is that the position he takes must have been implicit in the discourse of his time. What aspects of early 20th century german aesthetics do I need to research in order to better understand Benjamins starting point?

    Deepseek: To understand Walter Benjamin’s seemingly axiomatic statements in “The Task of the Translator” (1921), you need to situate them within the broader context of early 20th-century German aesthetics, particularly the intellectual currents that rejected instrumentalist or communicative theories of art. Here are key aspects to research:

    1. Autonomy of Art (Kunstautonomie)

    • Benjamin’s claim that art is not “for” the receiver aligns with the late 19th- and early 20th-century discourse on artistic autonomy, which held that art exists for its own sake (l’art pour l’art) rather than for moral, political, or communicative purposes.
    • Key figures: Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790) laid groundwork by distinguishing aesthetic judgment from utility; later, Friedrich Schiller and the Romantics expanded this. By Benjamin’s time, this idea was central to high modernist aesthetics.

    2. Formalism and Aesthetic Purism

    • The idea that art’s essence lies in its form rather than its reception or social function was prominent in movements like Formalism (e.g., Heinrich Wölfflin) and Pure Poetry (Stefan George’s circle).
    • Benjamin was influenced by (but also critical of) these trends, which often dismissed the audience’s role in constituting meaning.

    3. Symbolism and the “Pure Word” (Reine Sprache)

    • Benjamin’s translator essay ties into Symbolist ideas (e.g., Stéphane Mallarmé, Stefan George) where language and art strive for a transcendent, non-communicative purity. The “intentionless” nature of art he describes resonates with Symbolist depersonalization.

    4. Phenomenology and Aesthetic Experience

    • Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology (early 1900s) emphasized consciousness of the artwork rather than its empirical reception. Benjamin’s later work engages with this, but even here, the artwork’s “essence” is prior to its reception.

    5. Expressionism and the Crisis of Communication

    • German Expressionism (1910s–1920s) often rejected bourgeois audience expectations, favoring inner necessity over communicative clarity. Benjamin’s circle (e.g., Theodor Adorno) later radicalized this in critiques of mass culture.

    6. Theological and Mystical Undercurrents

    • Benjamin’s messianic/Marxist framework (influenced by Jewish mysticism and early Romanticism) treats art as a fragment of a higher, non-empirical truth. The receiver’s role is secondary to the artwork’s “afterlife” (Überleben) in history/translation.

    Key Contrasts to Clarify Benjamin’s Position:

    • Vs. Reception Aesthetics (e.g., Hans Robert Jauss): Later 20th-century theories centered the reader, but Benjamin’s era largely resisted this.
    • Vs. Marxist Instrumentalism: While Marxists (e.g., Georg Lukács) tied art to class struggle, Benjamin’s early work insists on art’s ontological independence.

    Recommended Readings:

    • Kant, Critique of Judgment (1790) – autonomy of aesthetic judgment.
    • Stefan George and Hugo von Hofmannsthal – Symbolist poetics in Germany.
    • Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraction and Empathy (1908) – formalism and anti-reception.
    • Hermann Cohen’s neo-Kantian aesthetics – art as pure production.
    • Gershom Scholem’s mysticism – influences on Benjamin’s language theory.

    Benjamin’s stance reflects a modernist refusal of communicative immediacy—art’s truth is not for the audience but emerges through history, translation, or divine/critical revelation. This position was partly a reaction against 19th-century realism and positivism, which tied art to empirical effects.

  • Something and Nothing with Deepseek

    Me: translate from german to english: gibt es etwasng

    Deepseek: The German phrase “gibt es etwas” translates to English as:

    “Is there something?”

    Alternatively, depending on the context, it could also mean:

    • “Is there anything?”
    • “Is something available?”

    If you provide more context (e.g., a full sentence or situation), I can refine the translation further!

    Me: the philosopher Heidegger uses this in his first lecture.

    Deepseek: Ah, you’re likely referring to Martin Heidegger and his famous opening line in his inaugural lecture “Was ist Metaphysik?” (“What is Metaphysics?”) delivered in 1929 at the University of Freiburg.

    He begins with the question:

    “Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?”

    (“Why is there something rather than nothing?”)

    This is one of the most fundamental questions in metaphysics, addressing the very existence of being (Seiendes) versus nothingness (Nichts).

    If you’re referring to a different Heidegger lecture where he uses “gibt es etwas” more directly, the phrase would still carry a similar existential weight—probing the givenness of being. In English, it would most naturally translate to:

    “Is there something?” (or more philosophically, “Is there anything given?”)

    Would you like a deeper analysis of Heidegger’s phrasing in a specific context? I’d be happy to help!

    Me: Is he referring here to Parmenides?

    Deepseek: Yes, Heidegger is indeed engaging with Parmenides in this fundamental question (“Why is there something rather than nothing?”), though not explicitly naming him in the opening of “What is Metaphysics?” (1929).

    Heidegger and Parmenides: The Question of Being

    Parmenides (5th century BCE) is the pre-Socratic philosopher who first rigorously posed the question of Being (τό ὄν, to on) versus Non-Being (τό μὴ ὄν, to mē on). His famous dictum:

    “For you could not know what is not (for it is not to be accomplished), nor could you express it.” (Fragment B2)

    Heidegger sees Parmenides as the primordial thinker who recognized that Being is, while Nothingness is not—and thus, the very possibility of metaphysics rests on this distinction.

    How Heidegger’s Question Relates to Parmenides

    1. The Primacy of Being (Sein)
    • Parmenides: Only Being truly is; Non-Being is unthinkable.
    • Heidegger: Modern philosophy has forgotten the question of Being (Seinsvergessenheit), and his work retrieves Parmenides’ insight in a new way.
    1. The Leap into Nothingness (das Nichts)
    • In “What is Metaphysics?”, Heidegger argues that Nothingness (das Nichts) is not mere negation but what reveals Being by contrast.
    • This mirrors Parmenides’ insistence that Non-Being cannot be thought, yet its “impossibility” defines Being.
    1. The Ontological Difference
    • Heidegger later distinguishes Being (Sein) from beings (Seiendes)—an echo of Parmenides’ separation of true Being from appearances.

    Conclusion

    While Heidegger does not directly cite Parmenides in the lecture’s opening, the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” is deeply Parmenidean. Heidegger sees himself as reawakening the forgotten Greek (especially Parmenidean) confrontation with Being—making Parmenides a silent but essential interlocutor.

    Would you like a closer look at how Heidegger interprets Parmenides in Being and Time or later works?

    Me: No, but I would like to know why greek philosophy is so important to the german philosophy at that time.

    Deepseek: Great question! The profound influence of Greek philosophy (especially pre-Socratics like Parmenides and Heraclitus, as well as Plato and Aristotle) on 19th- and 20th-century German philosophy stems from a combination of historical, intellectual, and cultural factors. Here’s why it was so crucial:


    1. The German Romantic & Idealist Rediscovery of the Greeks

    • Hölderlin, Hegel, and Schelling saw ancient Greece as the birthplace of authentic thought and poetic-philosophical unity.
    • Hegel declared that “with the Greeks, we feel ourselves at home,” seeing their philosophy as the dawn of Western reason.
    • The German Romantics (like Schlegel) believed the Greeks had a living connection to Being that modernity had lost—a theme Heidegger later radicalized.

    2. Nietzsche’s Radical Reinterpretation

    • Nietzsche (a major influence on Heidegger) attacked Socrates and Plato as the start of Western “decadence” but praised the pre-Socratics (Heraclitus, Parmenides) as tragic, poetic thinkers who faced existence directly.
    • His distinction between Apollonian (order) and Dionysian (chaos) forces in The Birth of Tragedy (1872) framed Greek thought as a struggle modernity had to reclaim.

    3. Husserl & Phenomenology’s Return to “Origins”

    • Edmund Husserl (Heidegger’s teacher) called for philosophy to go “back to the things themselves”—a methodological revival of Greek directness in questioning.
    • The Greeks (especially Aristotle) were seen as pre-theoretical, describing experience before it got distorted by later metaphysics.

    4. Heidegger’s “Destruction” of Metaphysics

    • Heidegger believed Western philosophy had been derailed by Roman and Scholastic translations of Greek terms (e.g., aletheia as “truth” instead of “unconcealment”).
    • His mission was to recover the original Greek experience of Being—before Plato “corrupted” it with abstract Forms.
    • Parmenides & Heraclitus became his heroes because they thought from Being itself, not from rigid categories.

    5. The Crisis of Modernity & the Search for Foundations

    • After WWI and the collapse of traditional values, German thinkers (like Heidegger, Jaspers, Gadamer) saw Greek thought as an alternative to Enlightenment rationalism and scientific reductionism.
    • The Greeks asked fundamental questions (“What is Being? What is truth?”) that modernity had forgotten—making them essential for rebuilding philosophy.

    Why the Pre-Socratics Specifically?

    • They were seen as pre-metaphysical, speaking from a world where logos (language), physis (nature), and aletheia (truth) were still intertwined.
    • Unlike Plato and Aristotle (who systematized philosophy), the pre-Socratics (Parmenides, Heraclitus, Anaximander) were fragmentary, poetic, and immediate—perfect for Heidegger’s “new beginning.”

    Conclusion: The Greeks as a Mirror for German Thought

    German philosophy didn’t just study the Greeks—it saw itself as continuing their project. From Hölderlin’s poetic idealism to Nietzsche’s Dionysian revolt to Heidegger’s “return to Being,” Greek thought was the corrective to modern alienation.

    Would you like a deeper dive into how a specific thinker (e.g., Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl) engaged with the Greeks?

    Me: Is this interest in anyway related to archeological excavations at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries?

    Deepseek: Yes, the archaeological discoveries of the late 19th and early 20th centuries did play a role in reinforcing German philosophy’s fascination with ancient Greece—though the relationship is more cultural and ideological than strictly causal. Here’s how they intersected:


    1. German Archaeology & the “Rediscovery” of Greek Origins

    • Heinrich Schliemann’s excavations (Troy, Mycenae, 1870s–1880s) and Wilhelm Dörpfeld’s work (Olympia, Tiryns) provided material proof of Homeric and pre-classical Greece, fueling a sense of direct connection to the ancient world.
    • The German Archaeological Institute (founded 1829) became a key player in Mediterranean digs, reinforcing Germany’s scholarly (and nationalistic) claim to Hellenic heritage.

    Impact on Philosophy:

    • The tangible ruins and artifacts gave weight to the Romantic/Idealist idea that Greece was not just a historical period but a living spiritual origin.
    • Heidegger later spoke of “the Greek temple” (The Origin of the Work of Art, 1935) as embodying the “world-disclosing” power of early Greek thought—a metaphor likely inspired by archaeological imagery.

    2. Nietzsche & the “Dionysian” Underground

    • Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy (1872) drew on archaeological aesthetics, contrasting the “Apollonian” (orderly, sculptural) with the “Dionysian” (ecstatic, subterranean)—a duality mirrored in excavations revealing both classical temples and older, chthonic cult sites.
    • Discoveries like the Dionysiac mysteries at Pompeii (excavated since the 18th century) lent credence to his vision of Greece as a tension between rationality and primal chaos.

    3. The “Purity” of Early Greece vs. Roman Corruption

    • German philologists (e.g., Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff) and archaeologists emphasized the pre-classical “purity” of Greek culture, contrasting it with later Roman/Hellenistic “decline.”
    • This aligned with Heidegger’s later argument that Roman translations of Greek terms (e.g., aletheiaveritas → “truth”) obscured the original experience of Being.

    4. Nationalism & the German-Greek Spiritual Kinship

    • Since Winckelmann (18th century), Germans saw themselves as the cultural heirs of Greece, a notion amplified by archaeology.
    • The excavation of Pergamon (brought to Berlin in the 1870s) and the Olympia excavations (1875–81) became symbols of Germany’s philhellenic mission—a mix of scholarship and ideological appropriation.
    • Heidegger’s later (problematic) linking of Greek “beginning” and German “future” (e.g., in Introduction to Metaphysics, 1935) echoed this nationalist undercurrent.

    5. Limits of the Connection

    • Philosophy’s Greece was often mythical: Heidegger cared little for actual archaeology; his “Greece” was a philosophical construct—a primal encounter with Being, not a historical society.
    • Nietzsche’s Greece was literary/philological: His insights came from texts (e.g., Heraclitus’ fragments), not digs.

    Conclusion: Archaeology as Catalyst, Not Cause

    The excavations reinforced but did not create German philosophy’s obsession with Greece. They provided:

    1. Material evidence for a “lost” world philosophers wanted to reclaim.
    2. Aesthetic and nationalist narratives (e.g., Germany as the new Greece).
    3. A counter-model to modernity—archaic Greece as unbroken, immediate, and pre-technological.

    For Heidegger, this aligned with his project of “destroying” metaphysics to return to an originary thinking—a philosophical “excavation” of Being itself.

    Would you like to explore how specific sites (e.g., Delphi, Eleusis) influenced philosophical ideas?

    Me: The distinction “Catalyst, Not Cause” is useful but the philosophy and the archaeology are concurrent so the “cause/effect” pair is uninteresting. What I am more interested in are the currents in the german history that make these parallel endeavours grow in the same cultural ground.

    Deepseek: You’re absolutely right to move beyond a simple cause/effect framework and instead look for the shared cultural, intellectual, and political currents in German history that made both the philosophical return to Greece and the archaeological obsession with it flourish in the same soil. Here’s a deeper analysis of those underlying forces:


    1. The German Sonderweg and the Search for Alternative Modernity

    Germany’s “special path” (Sonderweg)—its delayed unification (1871) and struggle to define itself against French rationalism and British empiricism—led to a yearning for cultural origins that predated (and surpassed) Enlightenment modernity.

    • Greek antiquity became a mirror: Unlike Rome (associated with Catholic universalism and French imperialism), Greece represented a purer, more poetic origin—one that German thinkers could claim as their own spiritual ancestry.
    • Philosophy & archaeology converged in this project: Both sought to uncover a “deeper” Germany through Greece—one intellectually (Heidegger’s Seinsfrage), the other materially (Schliemann’s Troy).

    2. Bildung and the Humboldtian University Ideal

    The 19th-century German university system (shaped by Wilhelm von Humboldt) was built on:

    • Philology as the queen of sciences: Nietzsche, Heidegger, and even Schliemann were trained in classical philology, which treated Greek texts as living thought, not dead history.
    • The unity of research and spirit: Archaeology (as Altertumswissenschaft) and philosophy were both seen as ways to recover lost wholeness—a key theme in German idealism and later existentialism.

    3. The Crisis of Historicism and the Hunger for Origins

    By the late 19th century, historicism (the idea that all truth is historically conditioned) had led to a sense of rootlessness.

    • Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations attacked historicism for paralyzing modern culture.
    • Heidegger’s Destruktion aimed to peel back layers of metaphysical tradition to reach a pre-historical (i.e., Greek) encounter with Being.
    • Archaeology offered “proof” of origins: The excavations at Olympia or Pergamon weren’t just academic—they were material witnesses to a time before decay, much like Heidegger’s pre-Socratics.

    4. Romantic Anti-Capitalism and the Rejection of Industrial Modernity

    Many German intellectuals (from the Romantics to Heidegger) saw industrialization as alienating and spiritually empty.

    • Greece symbolized pre-technological clarity: The Greek temple (for Heidegger) or the tragic chorus (for Nietzsche) represented a world where art, thought, and life were unified—before mechanization.
    • Archaeology as anti-modern: Unearthing handmade pottery, temples, and oral epic fragments was a tacit critique of mass production and disenchantment.

    5. Nationalism and the Kulturnation Idea

    Before political unification (1871), Germany defined itself as a Kulturnation—a nation bound by language and culture, not borders.

    • Greece as a proxy for German identity: Just as Greece was a “spiritual nation” before Alexander’s empire, Germany saw itself as a cultural powerhouse before Bismarck’s state.
    • Competition with France/Britain: German archaeology (e.g., Pergamon Altar in Berlin) and philosophy (Heidegger’s anti-Cartesianism) were both assertions of German superiority in preserving the “true” European spirit.

    6. The Weimar Era’s Krisis and Radical Returns

    After WWI’s trauma, the Weimar Republic became a hotbed of radical nostalgia.

    • Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927): Calls for a return to authentic existence—modeled on Greek aletheia (unconcealment).
    • Archaeology’s popular appeal: Exhibits like the Trojan gold (displayed in Berlin in the 1920s) fed a public longing for heroic origins amid economic and political chaos.

    Conclusion: A Cultural Ecosystem of Longing

    The parallel rise of Greek-focused philosophy and archaeology in Germany wasn’t coincidental—it grew from:

    1. A desire for unmediated origins (Urphänomene), whether in thought or material culture.
    2. A rejection of Western modernity’s fragmentation, with Greece as the antithesis.
    3. A nationalist-romantic project to claim the mantle of Europe’s true heirs.

    In this light, Heidegger’s Dasein and Schliemann’s Troy were two sides of the same coin: attempts to dig through time and touch a lost authenticity.

    Would you like to explore how specific institutions (e.g., the Nietzsche Archive, the German Archaeological Institute) fostered this convergence?

  • Whole Sort Of General Mish Mash

    WSOGMM

    “… any given universe is not actually a thing as such, but is just a way of looking at what is technically known as the WSOGMM, or Whole Sort of General Mish Mash. The Whole Sort of General Mish Mash doesn’t actually exist either, but is just the sum total of all the different ways there would be of looking at it if it did.

    The reason they [parallel universes] are not parallel is the same reason that the sea is not parallel. It doesn’t mean anything. You can slice the Whole Sort of General Mish Mash any way you like and you will generally come up with something that someone will call home.” Douglas Adams Mostly Harmless, p. 26

  • On Non-Existence

    Gorgias:

    1. Nothing exists;
    2. Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it; and
    3. Even if something can be known about it, knowledge about it can't be communicated to others.
    4. Even if it can be communicated, it cannot be understood.